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The present study supported the network contagion 
theory that healthcare providers are more likely to 
adopt the Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health 
Record (EHR) incentive program when their direct 
relations have more prior adopters. Spatial contagion, 
however, exhibits an opposite finding that healthcare 
providers geographically surrounded by more prior 
adopters are less likely to adopt the EHR incentive 
program. When taking both network contagion and 
spatial contagion into account, healthcare providers 
connected with more prior adopters within 30 miles are 
more likely to adopt the EHR incentive program. The 
findings enrich our understanding of how network 
contagion influences the diffusion of EHR incentive 
programs and how spatial contagion moderates the 
effects of network contagion on the diffusion of the EHR 
incentive programs.  
1. Introduction  
Health information technology (HIT) are the 
electronic systems that health care professionals and 
patients use to store, share and analyze health 
information. HIT has been widely applied to support 
healthcare systems and improve cost-effectiveness, 
efficiency, quality and safety of healthcare delivery [1]. 
The benefits of implementing HIT include automatizing 
labor-intensive work, minimizing human errors, 
speeding laboratory report deliveries, digitalizing 
patient records, and enhancing decision making and 
knowledge acquisition. Among those HIT, the 
electronic health records (EHRs) system is deemed as 
the most significant step in computerizing healthcare 
information systems. However, the adoption of the 
EHRs system had been less than 45 percent until 2009. 





hospitals in adopting EHRs included misaligned 
incentives, limited purchasing power among healthcare 
providers, the viability of EHR products and companies, 
and lack of demonstrated value of EHRs in practice [2]. 
In 2011, the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive 
Programs (now known as the Promoting Interoperability 
Programs) were established to facilitate the adoption 
and meaningful use of certified EHR technology in 
ambulatory practices and hospitals. The EHR incentive 
programs detail three stages that healthcare providers 
need to go through to be eligible for the monetary 
payments. The first stage expects the participants to 
establish the EHR infrastructure for the electronic 
extraction of clinical data. The second stage expects the 
participants to ensure the meaningful use of EHRs. The 
final stage expects the participants to produce better 
clinical outcomes and quality of care. 1  The eligible 
participates (professionals and hospitals) are defined by 
the EHR incentive program. 2  When the participants 
complete each stage, monetary payments are given. 
The current program evaluation mostly relies on 
conventional survey methods to investigate obstacles 
that the participants have encountered [3], [4]. The 
survey evaluations assume that the respondents make 
their decisions on the EHR incentive program adoption 
independently by assessing its cost-benefit without 
taking other healthcare providers' behavior into account. 
The policy recommendations made based on the 
findings of such evaluation studies do not reflect the 
prior research on medical diffusions, which informed us, 
for instance, that healthcare provider networks are likely 
to influence the diffusion of new drugs through either 
direct (network contagion) or indirect healthcare 
provider relationships (structural equivalence) [5], [6]. 
However, structural equivalence (i.e., similar network 
positions, e.g., measured by a focal actor's distance 
relations to other actors) is useful typically when a 
2 https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Eligibility- 





network is well-connected, but it serves little utility 
when a network is fragmented (i.e., not able to calculate 
the distance between actors based on unconnected 
relations). It should be expected that a similar process 
would be observed in the diffusion/adoption of the EHR 
incentive programs in healthcare provider networks. 
Moreover, spatial proximity or spatial interaction 
between healthcare providers would affect the 
adoption/diffusion process of the EHR incentive 
programs. Spatial proximity creates a space where 
mimetic behaviors and localized knowledge spillovers 
are possible and more likely through informal 
communications between healthcare providers [7]. The 
EHR incentive program information may be shared in 
healthcare provider networks and influences healthcare 
providers' decisions on program participation. Hence, 
this study aims to understand how healthcare providers’ 
network contagion and spatial proximity collectively 
determine the adoption/participation of the EHR 
incentive programs. 
The program participation data used in this study 
were downloaded from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human 
Services. The present study focused on 17,756 eligible 
healthcare providers between 2011 and 2015 in two 
hospital referral regions (HRR), Arlington areas (HRR 
code: 426), and Washington areas (HRR code:113). The 
provider patient-sharing networks, measured by referral 
relations, were constructed to examine how the program 
participation spreads in the healthcare provider 
networks. Survival analysis was used to estimate the 
program diffusion process.  
2. Literature reviews 
The adoption of technology as the adoption of an 
institution has been studied extensively in Information 
System research, e.g., enterprise resource planning 
systems or electronic trading systems [8]. For example, 
Sherer et al. used nationally representative data in 2008 
and 2012 to examine how institutional pressures 
influence the diffusion of EHRs [9]. The findings 
indicated that the mimetic process was a critical 
predictor of EHRs adoption in a highly uncertain 
environment in 2008. The coercive process became a 
significant predictor of EHRs adoption in 2012 after 
HITECH was enacted in 2009. The normative process 
has continually influenced the adoption of EHRs before 
and after 2009. Another research surveyed 191 U.S. 
healthcare employees enrolled in the online healthcare 
MBA program, and the findings showed that the 
mimetic and coercive pressures do not have direct and 
significant effects on the level of EMR adoption. The 
normative and mimetic pressures have indirect effects 
on the level of EHR adoption through top management 
participation (i.e., mediation effect) [10]. The 
inconclusive results of institution pressures on EHRs 
adoption may be caused by different research designs, 
sampling methods, population, and measures of 
institutional pressures. In addition to the institutional 
perspective, other studies also found that the adoption 
process of EHRs is substantially varied by healthcare 
providers' specialties [11] and networks [12], hospital 
scale, hospital ownerships and locations (urban vs. 
rural) [3], [13], performance expectancy, facilitating or 
inhibiting conditions [14]. However, those studies paid 
little attention to the role of healthcare provider 
networks in the adoption/participation of the Medicare 
and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs, which is 
deemed as an important stimulus for the increase of the 
EHR adoption rate in the U.S. Thus, this study attempts 
to examine how social contagion, spatial proximity, and 
the joint effect of social contagion and spatial proximity 
affect the adoption of EHR incentive program. 
2.1. Social contagion and network 
Social contagion theory is one of the underlying 
theories to elucidate how the spread of new ideas or 
practices is contingent on the way in which social 
proximity brings adopters and non-adopters together. 
Social proximity of innovations is expressed in two 
pathways to manage the uncertainty of costs and 
benefits: cohesion and structural equivalence [5], [6]. 
The cohesion approach argues that direct contacts and 
more frequent communication between adopters and 
non-adopters are a socialization process where adopters 
and non-adopters establish a normative understanding 
of the cost-benefit of adopting an innovation. When 
non-adopters are confronted with a need to make a 
decision in a vague situation, non-adopters would seek 
advice from whom they have established trust to discuss 
the innovation matter [15]. The contagion phenomena 
have been continuously found in the topics of the spread 
of options, attitudes, or behavior in communication 
networks [16]. Following this theory, our first 
hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Network contagion is positively 
associated with the adoption of the EHR incentive 
program. 
2.2. Spatial proximity and network 
The structural equivalence model holds a 
contradictory perspective stating that people would 
compete for "survival" and mimic or learn from each 
other when they occupy similar social structure 
positions but are not necessarily have a direct contact. 
For example, two primary care physicians compete to 
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serve as a new drug advisor in the healthcare market, or 
two graduate students, trained by the same academic 
advisor, compete for publications to earn their degrees. 
The structural equivalence model depicts that non-
adopters are likely to become adopters when non-
adopters maintain similar social positions as adopters 
[5]. The concept of structural equivalence has been 
extended to different measures of structural proximity. 
For example, Angst et al. investigated how prior 
adopters, social proximity, and spatial proximity 
influence the adoption of EHRs. Social proximity was 
operationalized as hospitals in the same health system, 
and spatial proximity was calculated based on the 
Euclidian distance between two hospitals' zip codes 
[17]. 
Spatial proximity as a predictor of the diffusion of 
adoption has demonstrated robust evidence. The 
arguments of spatial proximity follow a series of 
propositions. Companies consider location choices as a 
means of achieving economic benefits, such as the 
reduction of logistic or production costs, possibilities of 
recruiting skillful or low-cost employees, or 
opportunities of R&D collaboration with universities. 
Because of chasing similar economic incentives, 
companies with homogeneous features are likely to 
cluster in the same area, e.g., industrial parks [7]. 
However, the mechanism of information diffusions 
among companies is not merely based on homogeneous 
characteristics. Both competition and interaction play 
different roles in facilitating the diffusion of 
innovations. From the competition viewpoint, clustered 
companies with similar features are likely to form a 
competitive environment. Spatial proximity creates 
more opportunities for managers to observe and notice 
the incidence of innovation adoption from their rival 
companies. The diffusion of innovations is motivated by 
competition, and the diffusion process is based on 
mimicking behavior. From the interaction perspective, 
spatial proximity creates more opportunities for 
employees to initiate informal interactions and 
information exchange with other employees from rival 
companies. The information may be conveyed back to 
those employees’ companies and form a decision on 
innovations [18]–[20]. In addition, because tacit 
knowledge is not easy to be transferred from one to 
another, spatial proximity offers the opportunity to 
reduce the costs and facilitate complex forms of 
knowledge exchange and creation. Within a small 
boundary of an area, the frequent face-to-face 
interaction is a feasible means to distribute information 
and clarify whether the information is valuable [21]–
[23]. Thus, in the process of knowledge transfer, spatial 
proximity serves as a resolution of overcoming 
institutional differences between organizations [22]. 
Geographically bounded and localized Individual links 
and face-to-face interactions significantly contribute to 
knowledge transfer [24]. Hence, we hypothesize that 
healthcare providers working with other adopters in the 
same area are more likely to adopt the EHR incentive 
program: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Spatial proximity is positively associated 
with the adoption of the EHR incentive program 
 
Moreover, a direct healthcare provider network 
connection coupling with spatial closeness increases the 
propensity for the program infection. Spatial proximity 
might serve as a moderator for the spread of the EHR 
incentive program from one healthcare provider to 
another healthcare provider with a direct connection: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Spatial proximity is likely to accelerate 
the effect of network contagion on the adoption of the 
EHR incentive program. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Data sources and management 
To understand the effects of network contagion and 
spatial proximity on the adoption of the EHR incentive 
programs, this study used data from five sources: 
1. EHR Products Used for Meaningful Use 
Attestation Public Use File: The dataset contains 
healthcare provider's participation status in the EHR 





2. Physician Shared Patient Patterns Data: The 
dataset contains referrals from one healthcare provider 
to another within a specific time frame in the Medicare 
program. National Provider Identifier is used to 
establish referral networks. In their study, Barnett et al. 
examined the relationship between healthcare provider 
self-report networks and Medicare claim-based 
networks in the Boston Hospital Referral Region [25]. 
The results concluded that two healthcare providers 
shared more Medicare patients are more likely to 
increase the recognition of referral relationships and 
advice relationships. Thus, using referral networks to 
construct healthcare provider networks is appropriate. 
(https://questions.cms.gov/faq.php?faqId=7977) 
3. National Plan and Provider Enumeration System 
Data: The dataset is comprised of detailed profiles of 
healthcare and linked with NPIs. 
(http://download.cms.gov/nppes/NPI_Files.html) 
4. Hospital Referral Regions: The dataset 
“represents regional health care markets for tertiary 
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medical care that generally requires the services of a 
major referral center. The regions were defined by 
determining where patients were referred for major 
cardiovascular surgical procedures and for 
neurosurgery.” 
(http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/tools/downloads.aspx) 
5. TIGER/Line Shapefile, 2015, 2010 nation, U.S., 
2010 Census 5-Digit ZIP Code Tabulation Area 
(ZCTA5) National: The 2010 shpefile is used to create a 





The present study extracted eligible NPIs registered 
in the Arlington (HRR code: 426) and Washington 
(HRR code: 113) hospital referral regions from the 
National Plan and Provider Enumeration System 
published by Dartmouth Atlas of Health. The boundary 
definitions of hospital referral regions are adjusted every 
year, and the most up-to-date version was published in 
2014. Thus, we used the hospital referral region data 
from 2011 to 2014 and included all zip codes that 
appeared in any time periods in Arlington and 
Washington HRRs (Table 1). As the National Plan and 
Provider Enumeration System contains the NPIs’ 
addresses, zip codes from the system and hospital 
referral regions were used as the crosswalk variable to 
link healthcare provider addresses to zip codes in 
Arlington and Washington HRRs (Figure 1). The total 
number of zip codes was 761 representing a total of 
4,986 healthcare provider’s business locations. Those 
business locations were geocoded to latitude and 
longitude coordinates using Census’s web service.3 Of 
those 4,986 business locations, 600 addresses could not 
be found on the Census web. For those unfound 
locations, this study used Google Map to manually 
transform those addresses to latitude and longitude 
coordinates. The final data used in the analysis 
contained 17,756 healthcare providers and 3,418 
locations. 
 
Table 1: Arlington and Washington hospital referral 
regions 
HRR Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 Final Area 





Figure 1: Map for hospital referral regions 
 
To establish healthcare provider networks, the 
eligible NPIs were used to select referral claim data 
from the Physician Shared Patient Patterns data between 
2011 and 2015. The network properties extracted from 
the data are summarized in Table 2. The original data 
shows that the number of edges downloaded from 
Physician Shared Patient Patterns. It should be noted 
that the number of referrals increased between 2011 and 
2012 but decreased between 2012 and 2015. The 
network size is the total number of healthcare providers 
in the analysis. The total number of degrees is the 
number of all referrals made from a healthcare provider 
to other healthcare providers. The average degree 
represents the total number of degrees divided by the 
network size. The minimum degree reflects the number 
of healthcare providers who did not make Medicare 
claims in that year. The maximum degree represents the 
maximum number of claims that the healthcare 
providers made. The density represents all actual 
connections divided by all theoretically possible 
connections in the network. The density score ranges 
from 0 to 1. A density score that is close to 1 indicating 
the network is denser. A density score is close to 0 
indicating the network is loose. The healthcare provider 
networks here have low values of the density scores 
(0.003-0.006). This is expected because a larger 
network typically has a low density value than a smaller 
network where network members have a higher 
probability of reaching and knowing each other.  
 
Table 2: Properties of healthcare provider networks 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Network size 17,756 17,756 17,756 17,756 17,756 
Total number 
of degrees 
9,48,787 981,447 973,305 1,012,412 458,768 
Average 
degree 
53 55 55 57 26 
Min degree 0 0 0 0 0 
Max degree 1,413 1,445 1,394 1,388 866 
Density 0.0060 0.0062 0.0062 0.0064 0.0029 
 
The eligible 17,756 NPIs in the Arlington and 
Washington hospital referral regions were used to select 
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healthcare providers who participated in the stage one 
of the EHR incentive programs from the EHR Products 
Used for Meaningful Use Attestation Public Use File. 
Of those 17,756 NPIs, 5,092 NPIs participated in the 
EHR incentive program. 
3.2. Measurements 
Program Adoption is a binary variable measuring 
whether a healthcare provider adopted stage one of the 
EHR incentive program. “1” indicates that the provider 
adopted the program while “0” indicates otherwise. 
Business Size is a binary variable measuring 
whether an NPI business address has more than 10 
healthcare providers or less than 10. “1” represents that 
a healthcare provider’s business address has more than 
10 healthcare providers, while “0” represents that a 
healthcare provider’s business address has 10 or less 
than 10 healthcare providers. 
Network Contagion measures the probability of a 
healthcare provider being influenced by other connected 
healthcare providers for the decision to adopt the EHR 
incentive program. The variable is calculated by the 
summation of prior adopter/non-adopter multiplied by 
weighted connections. The weighted values are 
proportional to the healthcare provider’s direct 
connections. 
Spatial Contagion is used to measure the spatial 
proximity effect of adopters on susceptible healthcare 
providers. Spatial Contagion is the number of prior 
adopters within 30 miles of the healthcare provider’s 
business location. The decision for the 30 miles is 
arbitrary. A patient's maximum distance to visit primary 
care providers or specialists varies by state and whether 
the provider is located in an urban or rural area (Table 
3). Nonetheless, the number of primary care providers 
is larger than that of specialists, and most providers are 
located in urban areas, it may be reasonable to set the 
maximum distance based on the primary care providers 
in urban areas. Thus, the present study set the maximum 
distance as 15 miles for the Arlington HRR, reflecting 
that patients in the HRR are able to visit healthcare 
providers within 15 miles. In other words, if a patient 
lives in a place between two healthcare providers, an 
optimal maximum distance between two providers is 30 
miles, allowing the patient to visit them within 15 miles. 
Besides, only Virginia provides patients’ traveling 
information about visiting primary care providers and 
specialists. In order to create a consistent measure for 
the two HRRs, the present study applied Virginia’s 
standards to both Arlington and Washington HRRs. 
 
Table 3: Maximum Distance or Time an Enrollee 
Should Have to Travel to See a Provider (HHS, 2014) 
 Primary Care Providers Specialists 
District of 
Columbia 
Within 30 minutes’ travel time 
via public 
transportation or within 5 miles 
No standard 
Maryland Urban: Within 30 minutes or 
10 miles 
Rural: Within 30 minutes or 30 
miles 
No standard 
Virginia Urban: Within 30 minutes or 
15 miles 




Rural: Within 60 
miles 
 
3.3. Model specialization 
Because the program adoption variable is a time-
event data with right censoring, the hazard modeling is 
used as the main statistical method to analyze the data. 
The analysis also includes time-varying variables (i.e. 
network contagion and spatial proximity variables). 
Thus, the random-effects parametric survival model 
with the Weibull survival distribution (time duration 
distribution) was chosen to test the hypotheses. The 
healthcare providers in the same location are likely to 
have erroneously small standard errors due to data 
correlations. Thus, the clustered standard errors are used 
to correct the estimation, which yields 3,418 clusters 
(business locations) [26]–[29]. 
4. Analysis and results  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 shows that 63% of healthcare providers are 
in the business locations where there are more than 10 
healthcare providers, while 37% of healthcare providers 
are located in locations with less than 10 healthcare 
providers. The EHR adoption rate was 4% in 2011, 
increased to 12% in 2012, and then decreased to 4% in 
2014 and to 2% in 2015. The total adoption rate was 
28.68%, and the number of adoption was 5,092. The 
cumulative adoption rate is shown in Figure 4. Besides, 
the correlation coefficient between network contagion 
and spatial contagion is 0.2376 (P < 0.01). 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean/% S.D. Min Max 
Business Size (% of large) 17,756 63% 0.48 0 1 
Adoption rate in 2011 (%) 17,756 4% 0.20 0 1 
Adoption rate in 2012 (%) 17,756 12% 0.33 0 1 
Adoption rate in 2013 (%) 17,756 6% 0.24 0 1 
Adoption rate in 2014 (%) 17,756 4% 0.20 0 1 
Adoption rate in 2015 (%) 17,756 2% 0.14 0 1 
Network Contagion in 2011 17,756 0.05 0.12 0 1 
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Network Contagion in 2012 17,756 0.19 0.25 0 1 
Network Contagion in 2013 17,756 0.27 0.31 0 1 
Network Contagion in 2014 17,756 0.31 0.33 0 1 
Network Contagion in 2015 17,756 0.27 0.34 0 1 
Spatial Contagion in 2011 17,756 519.93 204.09 15 654 
Spatial Contagion in 2012 17,756 1955.39 727.56 45 2482 
Spatial Contagion in 2013 17,756 2677.47 1001.76 54 3364 
Spatial Contagion in 2014 17,756 3161.33 1187.93 67 3999 
Spatial Contagion in 2015 17,756 3406.26 1281.29 69 4317 
 
 
Figure 4: Cumulative Program Adoption Rate from 2011 
to 2015 
 
4.2. Hazard model analysis 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the hazard model 
analyses with different predictors for the adoption of the 
EHR incentive program. The first model shows that 
location size does not have a significant effect on the 
adoption. The second model predicts that the adoption 
rate would increase 177% with a unit increase in the 
network contagion measure. The adoption rate would 
decrease by 0.05% with a unit increase in spatial 
contagion. The fourth model includes all three 
predictors. The results indicate that all predictors are 
statistically significant. Business size and network 
contagion are positively associated with the adoption of 
the EHR incentive program, but spatial contagion is 
negatively associated. The fact that the business size is 
statistically insignificant in the first model while it has a 
statistically significant positive effect in the third model 
indicates that business size is likely to have interaction 
effects with other predictors. 
In the fifth model, we explored whether business 
size accelerates the effects of network contagion and 
spatial contagion on the adoption of the EHR incentive 
program (Hypothesis 3). The interaction effect of 
business size and spatial contagion was not statistically 
significant, while the other two interaction effects were 
statistically significant. Thus, the interaction effect of 
business size and spatial contagion was subsequently 
dropped from the fifth model. In the sixth model, both 
interaction terms were statistically significant, 
indicating that a large business size coupling with a high 
value of network contagion tends to lead to EHR 
adoption compared to a small business size with a higher 
value of network contagion. Likewise, a higher value of 
network contagion coupling with a higher value of 
spatial contagion tends to promote the adoption EHR 
incentive program compared to a lower value of 
network contagion coupling with a lower value of 
spatial contagion. 
Finally, there are several parametric distributions, 
which can be used to specify the hazard model. To 
ensure that the Weibull distribution is appropriate, we 
tested the goodness of fit of Gamma, Loglogistic and 
Lognormal distributions for the last model (Table 6). 
The table shows that the Weibull distribution has the 
best goodness of fits in terms of AIC and BIC.  
 
Table 5: Random effects Weibull regression 










(SE)   
BusinessSize 1.1236          
  (0.0831)          
NetworkContagion t-1   2.7679 ***     
      (0.1728)      
SpatialContagion t-1         0.9995 *** 
          (0.0000)  
Constant 0.0054 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0145 *** 
  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0013)  
Log pseudolikelihood -19812  -19502 *** -18698 *** 
Observations 71,024  71,024  71,024  
Groups 17,756  17,756  17,756  
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; SE adjusted for 3,418 clusters (locations) 
 
Table 5: Random effects Weibull regression (cont.) 
          
   4  5  6   









(SE)   
BusinessSize  1.3531 ** 1.8633 *** 1.5670 *** 
   (0.1332)  (0.3248)  (0.1794)  
NetworkContagion t-1 2.3715 *** 1.5275 ** 1.5548 ** 
    (0.2004)  (0.2069)  (0.2046)  
SpatialContagion t-1   0.9995 *** 0.9995 *** 0.9994 *** 
    (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BusinessSize x       0.7074 * 0.6850 ** 







1 2 3 4 5
Cumulative Adoption Rate (2011-2015)
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BusinessSize x       0.9999      
   SpatialContagion t-1     (0.0000)      
NetworkContagion t-1 x     1.0003 *** 1.0003 *** 
   SpatialContagion t-1     (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Constant  0.0096 *** 0.0098 *** 0.0109 *** 
   (0.0008)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  
Log pseudolikelihood  -18413 *** -18341 *** -18353 *** 
Observations  71,024  71,024  71,024  
Groups  17,756  17,756  17,756  
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; SE adjusted for 3,418 clusters (locations) 
 









AIC 36712.45 44762.89 44956.41 43886.89 
BIC 36778.21 44828.65 45022.17 43952.65 
 
5. Discussion 
The present study is the first research that used 
healthcare provider referral networks in panel data to 
examine the factors influencing the diffusion of the 
EHR incentive program in Arlington and Washington 
Hospital Referral Regions [30]. The results support the 
first and third hypotheses but did not support the second 
hypothesis. The findings indicate that healthcare 
providers exposed to more prior adopters in referral 
relations are more likely to adopt the EHR incentive 
program. Nevertheless, spatial contagion is negatively 
associated with the adoption of the EHR incentive 
program, indicating that healthcare providers 
geographically surrounded with more prior adopters 
within 30 miles are less likely to adopt the EHR 
incentive program. When specializing spatial contagion 
as a moderator, healthcare providers exposed to more 
prior adopters within 30 miles are more likely to adopt 
the EHR incentive program. Another intriguing finding 
is that business size matters, but only when network 
contagion is considered. A susceptible healthcare 
provider with a large business size connected with more 
EHR incentive program adopters tends to increase the 
likelihood of the program adoption. This often happens 
when non-adopters and adopters are affiliated with the 
same health care system.  
The analytical approach and the findings of the 
present study have several implications. First, the 
analytical framework used in the present study can be 
applied to understand other diffusion phenomena 
including that of other health policy programs, new 
drugs or therapies diffusion. Prior research explored the 
association between properties of healthcare provider 
referral networks and patient characteristics [31], while 
other researchers examined how healthcare provider 
referral networks are associated with health care 
patterns [25]. For policymakers, the network analysis 
approach can be used as guidance to identify key 
providers that may facilitate the policy implementation 
process [32]–[34]. Such a study, however, would 
require collecting more data on healthcare provider 
characteristics, e.g., whether the provider is a specialist 
or a primary care provider. 
Second, the spatial proximity theory is not 
supported in our findings. One possible explanation is 
the inappropriate measure of the variable. In this study, 
spatial proximity is measured by spatial contagion and 
is defined as the number of prior adopters within 30 
miles of the provider’s location. Although 30 miles may 
be appropriate for providers in the urban area in 
Northern Virginia (Arlington HRR), it may be too large 
for providers in the urban areas in Southern Maryland or 
the District of Columbia (Washington HRR). Further 
investigation on the optimal distance is warranted as 
well as a sensitivity analysis with different values for the 
maximum distance.  
Third, the business size in our study plays a 
significant role in facilitating the network contagion 
process. Healthcare providers with a large business size 
can be viewed as working in large hospitals, i.e., large 
hospitals are expected to have a higher capacity to 
implement EHR systems or handle the administrative 
process of the program participation. When those 
healthcare providers in a large hospital system are 
exposed to more prior adopters via referral networks, the 
peer pressure will influence their decisions on the 
program adoption. In contrast, healthcare providers in a 
small location tend to have less capacity to implement 
EHR or to handle the administrative process. Even 
though peer pressure can influence those healthcare 
providers’ decisions to adopt the program, lack of 
organizational resources may hamper the program 
adoption. Furthermore, the matter of a business size 
depends on the unit of analysis. In practice, the EHR 
incentive program may be adopted by hospitals and then 
spreads to healthcare providers. However, this study 
assumed that healthcare providers are the decision-
makers of the program. Future investigation may 
aggregate the data to estimate whether the network 
contagion and spatial contagion still contribute to the 
adoption of the EHR incentive program at the hospital 
level. 
6. Limitations 
At present, several limitations remain unsolved and 
deserve further progress. First, this study chose 
Arlington and Washington HRRs as a case study to 
explore how the EHR incentive programs diffuse among 
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healthcare provider networks. The analysis results are 
unavoidably limited to these two areas and are not 
sufficient to represent the nationwide diffusion of the 
program. Second, the healthcare provider network data 
are only available between 2011 and 2015. The data 
period restricts the time window that we could analyze. 
Third, this study has not yet collected the characteristics 
(e.g., locations of urbanization or cognition about the 
EHR program) of healthcare providers. Those factors 
are likely to contribute to the diffusion of the EHR 
incentive program. Finally, the model specification has 
not yet balanced data or controlled for instrumental 
variables to make causal inferences. The conclusion of 
this study should be only used to infer the association 
between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable. 
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